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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 12-2317 
________________ 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
BRIAN DAVID PILCH,  
 
Appellant 
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 2-11-cr-00179-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Gene E. K. Pratter 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 11, 2013 
 
 
Before:  McKEE, Chief Judge, AMBRO, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion filed : September 11, 2013) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
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Brian David Pilch pled guilty to possession of child pornography in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) after police discovered 85 images of child pornography on his 
home computer.  The District Court sentenced Pilch to 57 months’ imprisonment.  He 
argues that his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable.
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We review both the procedural and the substantive reasonableness of a district 
court’s sentence for abuse of discretion.  Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); 
United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  We must “ensure 
that the [D]istrict [C]ourt committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to 
calculate (or improperly calculating) the [U.S. Sentencing] Guidelines range, treating the 
Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C] § 3553(a) factors, selecting a 
sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen 
sentence.”  Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.  If the sentence is procedurally sound, we then consider 
if it is substantively reasonable given “the totality of the circumstances.”  Id.  If the 
sentence is within the applicable Guidelines range, we may presume that the sentence is 
reasonable.  Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350–51 (2007).  Any objection that was 
not raised before the District Court at sentencing is reviewed for plain error.  United 
States v. Ward, 626 F.3d 179, 183 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Pilch argues that U.S.S.G § 2G2.2(b)(7)(A) frustrates Congressional intent, that 
the District Court committed procedural errors in sentencing, and that his sentence is 
substantively unreasonable.  First, Pilch challenges the two-level increase for possessing 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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85 images of child pornography.  He argues that increasing the offense level based on the 
number of images possessed is inappropriate because 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) 
criminalizes all possession of “1 or more” images.  Pilch did not oppose this adjustment 
before the District Court, and he does not provide authority or precedent in support of his 
interpretation of Congressional intent.  His argument thus fails. 
Pilch also makes two arguments that the Court’s sentence was procedurally 
unreasonable.  First, he believes the Court erred when it denied his request to vary from 
the child pornography sentencing ranges under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2, which he argues are 
not based on empirical data.  We have held that a district court may vary from the 
sentencing ranges determined under § 2G2.2 if the court articulates a policy disagreement 
with these Guidelines.  United States v. Grober, 624 F.3d 592 (3d Cir. 2010).  However, 
“if a district court does not in fact have a policy disagreement with § 2G2.2, it is not 
obligated to vary on this basis.”  Id. at 609.  Here, the District Court considered the 
Guidelines and understood its authority to vary from them.  Its decision to sentence 
within that range was not an abuse of discretion. 
Next, Pilch argues that the District Court’s sentence is procedurally unreasonable 
because the Court failed to consider all of the § 3553(a) factors.  We disagree.  The Court 
reviewed all of the relevant factors, including the nature of the offense, Pilch’s history 
and characteristics, and the need for the sentence imposed.  
Finally, Pilch argues that the sentence was substantively unreasonable.  Given the 
totality of the circumstances, we find this argument unpersuasive.  The Court considered 
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Pilch’s arguments and applied a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range.  We 
discern no abuse of discretion.   
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.    
 
